INTRODUCTION
Despite longstanding conventional financial advice to minimize idiosyncratic risk by holding well-diversified portfolios (c.f., McKay et al., 2018) , several studies document that both individuals and investment funds concentrate their trades and holdings in certain firms or industries (Brands et al., 2005; Baks et al., 2006; Goldman et al., 2016) . Researchers have offered several reasons, including reducing investment information overload (Simon 1972; Agnew and Szykman, 2004: Garvey et al., 2017) , possessing an information advantage (Lee and Rahman, 1991; Kacperczyk et al., 2005; Hiraki et al., 2015) , and behavioral biases like familiarity (Pool et al., 2012) or overconfidence (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008) , for why individuals and funds would concentrate investment activity and holdings. In this study, we examine the association between investor industry trading concentration I and the use of an exploitable industry-specific database to test these competing explanations for investment concentration. We find that concentrated industry trading is positively associated with the use of publicly available industry-specific information by mutual funds, but not pension funds. While most prior research assumes that concentration arises due to information advantage, our findings shed light on the source of information advantage, i.e., information asymmetry from private information versus information processing skills. Our findings also reveal that the underlying reason for investment concentration varies across investor types.
Prior research has documented the return benefits of portfolio concentration (c.f., Goldman et al., 2016; Jennings and Payne, 2016; McKay et al., 2018) and have often ascribed it to an information advantage (Ke and Petroni, 2004; Kacperczyk et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008 Cohen et al., , 2010 . This is largely because most of the proposed reasons for investment concentration predict no association or an ambiguous relation between concentration and performance; yet only the more sophisticated institutional investor's use of the NHTSA complaint data because less sophisticated investors are likely to overlook data that is harder to interpret and that requires more time and attention to assimilate due to the time needed and the cognitive difficulty in extracting usable information from complex data sources (Bloomfield, 2002) .
Prior research examining investment concentration has typically examined either individual investors or only mutual funds. Prior studies find however that different types of institutional investors engage in heterogeneous trading (Bushee, 2001; Bushee and Goodman, 2007) . Specifically, mutual funds are transient and active investors that are more likely to trade on short-term news and turn over their investment portfolios significantly more often compared to pension funds (Yan and Zhang, 2009 ). Further, the evidence suggests that total assets under management by pension funds exceeds that by mutual funds in the United States ($7.3 Trillion versus $5.2 Trillion) (e.g., Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002) . Therefore, in order to conduct a more complete analysis of institutional investor trading behavior, we examine the association between portfolio trading concentration and the use of information advantage by both mutual funds and pension funds. Specifically, we consider the possibility that the underlying reason for trading concentration can differ by the type of institutional investor and variation in investor type affects investors' ability to utilize disclosed information (Kalay, 2015) . Thus, our study is at the crosssection of institutional investor trading behavior, use of industry-specific data as the means of information advantage, and industry concentrated trading.
We obtain institutional investors' detailed daily trading data from Ancerno Ltd for the period 2002 through 2010. We obtain auto product recall announcements from the NHTSA database for six major auto manufacturers during the same period, resulting in 579 recall incidents. We then identify all customer complaints included in the NHTSA data related to the product recalls. Prior research has shown that increased auto product complaints are associated with a higher likelihood of auto recalls, and while firm insiders appear to trade on this data, the market in general does not appear to use complaint data to determine equity prices of auto firms (Gokalp et al., 2016) . We first affirm that the equity market, in general, does not appear to utilize the NHTSA complaint data in arriving at equity prices during our examination period.
Specifically, we find that abnormal stock returns for the market are negatively associated with customer complaint levels, but only after a product recall has been announced, indicating that share prices generally do not incorporate this complaint data prior to recalls. This result establishes that the NHTSA complaint data is both economically value-relevant and that the market in general does not impound this information into stock prices in a timely manner.
Therefore, investors aware of its economic value could exploit the NHTSA data; thereby creating the classic context for information advantage.
Next, we examine institutional investor trading activity, and find no significant relation between overall institutional investor abnormal net trading and customer complaint levels in the pre-recall announcement period. However, we find significant aggregate abnormal net selling in the post-recall announcement periods, suggesting that, as a group, institutional investors generally become aware of the recall campaign's details and financial consequences and use the NHTSA complaint data to inform their trading decisions only after the recall. We then partition the institutional investors into mutual funds and pension funds and find that mutual funds are significant abnormal net sellers in the pre-recall announcement period and continue to be abnormal net sellers in the post-announcement periods, especially when complaint levels are high. In contrast, pension funds are significant abnormal net buyers during the pre-recall period when complaint levels are high and they are neither significant abnormal buyers nor sellers in the immediate post-announcement period. Our findings suggest that mutual funds are on average better than pension funds at using the information in the complaint data to inform their trading decisions.
To examine the effect of industry-level trading concentration on institutional investor trading, we calculate a fund-specific measure of industry trading concentration based on the percentage of shares traded in the auto industry to total shares traded by the fund for the period.
Using this fund-specific measure, we find that mutual funds with greater levels of auto industry trading concentration exhibit better utilization of the NHTSA complaint data to inform their trading decisions. Our finding of more informed trading by industry concentrated mutual funds is consistent with the superior returns performance of concentrated portfolios found in prior research. II More importantly, unlike most prior research attributing information advantage to private information acquisition, our findings support the information advantage due to specialization argument for holding concentrated portfolios. III We also find that pension funds' use of the NHTSA complaint data does not improve with their industry trading concentration.
Thus, unlike mutual funds, pension funds appear to concentrate in the auto industry for reasons other than the information advantage explanation.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. We extend the literature on portfolio concentration by, to our knowledge, presenting the first examination of the association between investor industry trading concentration and the use of a specific value relevant source of industry-specific information to inform trading behavior. Prior research argues that portfolio concentration is consistent with information advantage because of the superior returns performance of concentrated portfolios. The existing studies however do not distinguish between the underlying source of information advantage, i.e., private information versus superior information processing, and generally assumes that it arises from private information. Our study not only provides an assessment of the widely accepted information advantage reason for investment concentration, it also provides the first direct examination of superior information processing as the underlying source of the information advantage.
Our assessment of the auto customer complaint data compiled by the NHTSA and its association with institutional investor trading activity also contributes to the literatures on market inputs and institutional investor trading behavior. Our study is unique in that we: 1) examine more than one type of investor (e.g., individuals, mutual funds, etc.), and 2) present the first examination of pension funds in the investment concentration context. Specifically, we extend the literature by separately studying investment behavior of both mutual funds and pension funds. Our finding that mutual funds appear to trade consistent with the information contained in the levels of customer complaints, but pension funds do not, provides additional insights into the microstructure of institutional investor trading behavior and reinforces the need to separately examine these two types of institutional investors. Specifically, we find that industry trading concentration is not associated with pension funds' use of information in the NHTSA complaint data, which suggests that the underlying reason for trading concentration varies across investor types.
Our study also contributes to the extant literature by demonstrating the usefulness of an investor-specific measure of industry trading concentration. Calculating investor industry concentration as a percentage of an investor's overall trading activity, as opposed to holdings, in a single industry is a straightforward and intuitive determination of an investor's focus on that specific industry. Our results suggest that this measure of industry concentration may be useful in other investment contexts, and that future researchers should consider industry concentration effects when assessing investment behavior.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we discuss the prior literature and develop our research hypothesis. We then discuss our sample and data selection procedures, followed by a presentation of our research measures and descriptive statistics. Next, we present our empirical tests and results, and the final section concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Investors often favor concentrated holdings in lieu of more diversified portfolios, and specialize in one or a few companies or industries. Prior research has offered several reasons, including reducing investment information overload (Simon, 1972; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Agnew and Szykman, 2004.) , possessing an information advantage (Kacperczyk et al., 2005; Hiraki et al., 2015) , and behavioral biases like familiarity (Pool et al., 2012) or overconfidence (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008) , for why individuals or funds would maintain relatively concentrated holdings. Although in contrast to "conventional" financial investment advice, research examining individual investors (Ivkovic et al., 2008; Ekholm and Maury, 2014) and mutual funds (Kacperczyk et al., 2005; Baks et al., 2006; Huij and Dewall, 2011) have consistently found that investors with more concentrated holdings earn higher returns compared to similar investors with more diversified holdings. In this study, we examine the association between investor industry trading concentration and the use of an exploitable industry-specific database, and test these explanations for investment concentration as each have differing predictions for the use of industry-specific information and industry trading concentration.
If investors concentrate in a few industries as a way to minimize information overload (Simon, 1972) , we would generally expect no significant association between industry-specific information and trading behavior, particularly if the information is complex, voluminous or difficult to relate to the firm's or industry's performance or earning potential. In such situations, investors would choose to ignore the industry-specific information altogether, resulting in no expected association. If investors concentrate in firms or industries because of familiarity (Pool et al., 2012) , the association between industry-specific information and trading behavior is ambiguous. The association could be positive if the industry-specific information is also positively correlated with other firm or industry information that the investor is familiar with.
However, the association could also be negative or not significant if the industry-specific information is negatively correlated, or not correlated, with other firm or industry general information the investor already possesses (Ivkovic and Weibenner, 2005; Ivkovic et al., 2008) .
If investors concentrate in firms or industries because of overconfidence (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008) , we would generally expect no significant association between industry-specific information and investor trading as overconfident investors tend to ignore additional information as irrelevant to their already established evaluations Odean, 2000, 2001) .
Unlike the other reasons for investment concentration, only the information advantage reason predicts a purely positive relationship between concentration and use of industry-specific information. The information advantage reason espouses that investors concentrate in firms or industries because the information advantage, whether it be due to private information or superior information processing, enables them to respond to firm-specific or industry-specific information in a more timely manner than other investors. Hence, we would expect there to be a positive association between industry-specific information and trading behavior for industry concentrated investors.
IV
Notwithstanding the alternative reasons for investment concentration, the preponderance of research in this area has considered information advantage through acquisition of private information as the most plausible reason for investor concentration and the higher returns to investments by concentrated investors. Company size and locality (i.e., smaller local companies), or number of analysts following a stock Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; Ivkovic et al., 2008) have been used to proxy for situations where information advantage may exist that could be exploited by concentrated investors. For example, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) find that investors investing in smaller, non-S&P 500 companies that are in close proximity to themselves (i.e., local companies) outperform their other investments, presumably due to the additional information available about the company in the local geographic area surrounding the company that is not available to other non-local market participants. In addition, prior research has found that social or educational ties between investors and firm management represent situations in which information advantage through private information is likely to exist (Cohen et al., 2008 (Cohen et al., , 2010 Eggers and Hainmueller, 2014; Pool et al., 2015) . For example, Cohen et al. (2008) find that mutual fund managers invest more heavily in firms in which they share educational ties with corporate board members, and that these investments outperform their other non-tie investments by up to 7.8% per year.
Recent research has begun to assess whether investors' prior expertise and knowledge serve as the source of their information advantage and is the reason for investors' portfolio performance. For example, Cici, Gehde-Trapp, Goricke, and Kempf (2014) examine the effect of prior non-financial-sector experience of fund managers and find that mutual fund managers with experience outside of the financial services sector are able to exploit their industry-specific knowledge. Specifically, they find that these managers are better able to pick specific stocks and time industry trends for industries in which they have prior work experience. Most recently, Kostovetsky and Ratushny (2016) examine performance of mutual funds specializing in the health sector and find that managers that have prior formal health-related training outperform managers without such training by almost five percent per year. Overall, these studies document a significant positive association between investors' expertise and portfolio performance, suggesting that prior experience enables them to better process information available to all investors. These studies however do not examine specific sources of information, nor do they examine the association between investors' superior information processing skills and concentrated investment trading.
In this paper, we extend these studies by investigating the association between industry trading concentration and the use of an exploitable source of industry-specific information.
Unlike most prior research attributing concentration to information advantage based on the returns performance of concentrated portfolios, we provide direct evidence on the link between industry trading concentration and information advantage by examining whether greater industry trading concentration is related to the use of a specific source of industry data. Moreover, while prior research generally assumes that information advantage arises due to information asymmetry, which suggests that investors concentrate in companies or industries for which they have private information, we consider the possibility that investors can also concentrate their trading because they are able to better process information available to all investors. Thus, we examine whether greater concentration in the auto industry is related to the use of auto product complaint data available from the NHTSA.
We focus on the auto industry because it is a significant and visible component of the equity market, and it receives more product complaints than any other industry, and results in the costliest product recalls (Chen and Nguyen, 2013; Ni et al., 2014) . Prior studies also find that the announcement of an auto recall attracts wide media coverage and is often accompanied by a negative stock price reaction (Jarrell and Peltzman,1985; Pruitt and Peterson, 1986; Hoffer et al., 1988; Bromiley and Marcus, 1989; Chu et al., 2005) . Further, Gokalp et al. (2016) find that NHTSA complaint data is positively related to product recalls in the subsequent quarter and that the stock market, in general, does not impound the complaint data into share prices until after a recall is announced. Yet, they find that when NHTSA complaint levels are high, auto firm insiders are net sellers of personal shares before recall announcements, suggesting that auto firm insiders benefit from the use of the complaint data to time sales of equity securities before recall announcements.
Following prior research (Ke and Petroni, 2004; Bushee and Goodman, 2007; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012) , we identify institutional investors as one of the most sophisticated investor groups that would be most likely to incorporate the NHTSA complaint data into their analyses and to actively trade on this information. V We argue that while the market in general does not appear to utilize the NHTSA complaint data in determining equity prices, more sophisticated investors may be able to use the complaint data to inform their trades, similar to knowledgeable firm insiders. That is, while the aggregate market may not be able to effectively utilize the large volume of auto complaint data, we expect that some of the most sophisticated equity investors in the market would be able to use this data to their relative investing advantage. In particular, we examine whether institutional investors concentrate in the auto industry due to their superior processing of publicly available information in the auto industry. Therefore, we assess whether institutional investors that concentrate their trading in the auto industry are able to exploit the information contained in the NHTSA complaint data better than non-concentrating institutional investors.
Prior research examining investment concentration has typically examined individual investors or only mutual funds. We use a unique database that contains an investor-type code that allows us to categorize funds by type of investor into mutual funds or pension funds. The evidence suggests that different types of institutional investors follow different trading strategies (Bushee, 2001; Bushee and Goodman, 2007) . Specifically, prior research has documented significant differences between mutual and pension funds in terms of type of their clientele, characteristics of their money managers, level of fiduciary responsibility, risk taking behavior, and, importantly, investment horizon (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Bushee, 2001; Del Guerico and Tkac, 2002; Ke and Petroni, 2004; Yan and Zhang, 2009; Ramalingegowda ,2014) . Thus, we consider the possibility that the reasons for concentrated trading might differ by the institutional investor type and therefore examine the association between concentration and the use of information advantage separately for mutual funds and pension funds.
A positive association between use of the NHTSA complaint data and industry trading concentration would be consistent with superior information processing leading to the information advantage reason for investment concentration. In addition, we examine trading related to a unique industry-specific data set -auto customer complaints submitted to the NHTSA. This data is highly industry specific in terms of its generation and information content, and its free dissemination to interested parties makes it equally available to all interested parties. Accordingly, our setting provides a unique opportunity to examine the relation between industry trading concentration and information advantage that arises from superior information processing skills, rather than information advantage due to access to private information. Thus, if institutional investors concentrate their trades in the auto industry because of their superior information processing skills, we argue that they will more accurately identify and associate higher levels of customer complaints with an increased probability of future product recalls.
Therefore, we expect institutional investors to sell equity shares of auto firms prior to recall announcements when customer complaints are high. Accordingly, our main hypothesis is:
H1: Institutional investors that concentrate trades in the auto industry have greater abnormal net selling of auto firms before recall announcements when complaint volume is high compared to non-concentrators.

SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA
Institutional Investors
In order to examine the impact of auto industry trading concentration on the association between customer complaints and institutional investor trading activity around auto recall announcements, we utilize the data on institutional investor daily trading activity provided by identified with a unique investor code which enables us to aggregate all trades by each institutional investor. VIII The database also contains an investor-type code that allows us to categorize funds by type of investor into mutual funds or pension funds.
Auto Complaint and Recall Data
We then merge the NHTSA complaint and recall data with Compustat, CRSP, and the Ancerno Ltd. databases, subject to the data restrictions discussed in the next section. Our final sample consists of 3,118 institutional investor firm-year observations (mutual funds n=1,075; pension funds n=2,113), 151,735 customer complaints involving 6,717 separate MMY configurations related to 579 product recall announcements across the six automobile companies.
After merging institutional trading data providing unique fund identifiers with recall and financial data, our final sample period spans 2002-2010.
VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Industry Trading Concentration
We create an industry trading concentration metric for each investment fund in each year based on the fund's percentage total trading volume in the 2-digit auto industry SIC (i.e., 37).
Our trading concentration metric, CONCMET f,i , is computed as the ratio of each fund's trading activity, buy plus sell, in the auto industry scaled by the fund's total trading activity in that year. XI In particular,
( 1) where BUY f,i (SELL f,i 
Abnormal Trading
We compute net abnormal institutional trading around each recall announcement. We begin by calculating the total number of shares purchased by institutional investors minus the number of shares sold, divided by total number of shares outstanding. This is our measure of net institutional investor trading over the period, calculated separately for the pre-recall period and two post-recall periods. Our pre-recall period (PRE) is the three months ending the day before the recall announcement date [-63, -1] . Our first post-recall period (POST1) is the three months subsequent to the recall beginning two days after the recall announcement date [+2, +63], and our second post-recall period (POST2) is the three months beginning after the end of the first post-event period [+64, +126]. We also obtain net institutional trading during our control period of three months immediately preceding our pre-recall period [-126, -64] . Therefore, we require six months of institutional trading information before and six months after a recall announcement. Following the prior literature (e.g., Cready et al., 2014) , we calculate abnormal net institutional trading for the pre-and post-recall periods as follows:
where BUY ip (SELL ip ) represents total number of shares purchased (sold) by the Ancerno investors in firm i during period p, and SHO i is the total number of shares outstanding for firm i at the beginning of the period p. Therefore, ∑ATRADE represents institutional investors' total percentage abnormal net trading activity in firm i during our event periods, i.e., the pre-recall and two post-recall periods. We then divide ∑ATRADE by three to find the average monthly abnormal net trading in each of our 3-month event periods. Thus, ATRADE_PRE is the average monthly abnormal net trading in the pre-recall period, and ATRADE_POST1 and ATRADE_POST2 are the average monthly abnormal net trading in the first and second postrecall periods, respectively.
Customer Complaints and Product Recalls
We investigate whether institutions trade on the information from NHTSA complaint data by obtaining the recall report date for each recall from the NHTSA recall data and aggregating all customer complaints associated with the recall for the preceding one-year period ending one day before the recall date (COMPLAINT). A recall may include several MMYs. If there is a previous recall on a MMY within a one-year period, then we only use the complaints on the MMY following the previous recall date. When there is no complaint recorded in the NHTSA data during the year preceding a recall, we set the complaint measure to zero for that recall.
We use a standardized complaint measure in our regression analyses to mitigate concerns that the relation between complaints and the likelihood of recalls could be driven by firm-level specific omitted factor(s) such as unit sales volume that is likely to affect both number of complaints and recalls. We first winsorize COMPLAINT at the 99 th percentile for each firm, and then standardize by dividing it by the maximum number of complaints for the firm over the sample period. The standardized complaint measure (SCOMPLANT) varies between 0 and 1 for each firm.
We examine institutional investors' abnormal trading activity in the pre-recall period to determine if concentrated institutional investors are better than others at predicting the increased likelihood of recalls associated with higher customer complaints. Similarly, we examine abnormal trading activity in the post-recall periods to assess whether institutional investors with concentrated trading are more timely than other investors at reacting to the customer complaint information.
Descriptive Statistics
We report the descriptive statistics for our sample of recall announcements in Panel A of Table 1 . COMPLAINT is the number of prior customer complaints per recall from the NHTSA complaint files. The mean (median) of COMPLAINT is 29 (2), and at least one complaint occurs during 76.5% of recalls (untabulated). The abnormal net institutional trading in the pre-recall period, ATRADE_PRE, is -0.127 (p-value <.01) and in the post-recall periods, ATRADE_POST1
and ATRADE_POST2, are -0.118 and -0.014, respectively. Thus, we observe an overall institutional net selling that is higher during the pre-and post-recall periods than the control Table 1 and show that the standardized complaint is negatively correlated with excess returns over the 12-month horizon following the recall report date. This is consistent with our argument that complaints contain economically relevant information concerning the recall's financial outcome and that this information is not reflected in stock prices before the recall date. We also document that SCOMPLAINT is negatively correlated with abnormal trading in both post-recall periods, suggesting that institutional investors use the complaint data to inform their trading after the recall. between the mutual and pension funds (2.5% and 2.4%, respectively). However, we clearly observe a significant difference in the total trading activity by the two types of funds as the average trading volume of mutual funds is nearly nine times bigger than that of pension funds ($27.4 billion versus $3 billion, respectively). This finding is consistent with mutual funds being more active traders than pension funds even though total assets under management by pension funds exceeds that by mutual funds (e.g., Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002; Zhong et al., 2017) .
Finally, classifying funds based on their size, proxied by their annual total dollar value of trading volume as in Cready et al. (2014) , we report in Panel C that the percentage trading concentration metric does not change substantially by fund size. Thus, our auto industry trading concentration metric is distinct from the fund size of these investors.
EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS
Complaints and Abnormal Returns around Recall Announcements
We begin by first investigating whether the market incorporates the complaint information into stock prices in a timely manner during our examination period. If the market incorporates the complaint data timely into stock prices, then there would be no real opportunity to exploit this data, and therefore no opportunity for an information advantage. However, if the complaint data is economically informative but the market on average does not incorporate the complaint data in a timely manner, we expect to find a negative association between complaints and excess returns following the recall report date, but no association leading up to it.
Accordingly, we examine whether complaint measures are negatively associated with excess returns following the recall report date by estimating the following regression model:
where CAR is the cumulative value-weighted excess returns over the 3-month, CAR [+2, +63], CAR[+2, +126] , and 12-month, CAR [+2,+253] , horizons beginning two days following the recall announcement date. We also consider the returns over 3 months during the preannouncement period, CAR [-63,-1] , to examine the possibility that investors at least in part incorporate complaint information into stock prices. SCOMPLAINT is the standardized complaint measure ranging between 0 and 1 for each firm. LMV is the logarithm of the market value (MV) where MV is measured as the stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. BM is calculated as the book value of common stock (CEQQ) divided by MV as of the most recent fiscal year before the event window. MOMENTUM is cumulative abnormal returns (raw return minus the CRSP value-weighted index returns) over the three-month period ending one day before the beginning of the event window, i.e., the return accumulation window.
We estimate model (2) for the excess returns over various windows around the recall report date and report the results in Table 3 . We find that the coefficient on the standardized complaint measure, SCOMPLAINT, is insignificant when we measure returns over the 3 months before the recall announcement [-63, -1] , and is negative and significant when the returns are measured over the 6-and 12-months in the post-recall announcement period. Thus, we find that the market generally fails to incorporate complaint information in a timely manner during our examination period. Since our complaint measure is standardized to range between 0 and 1, the coefficients on the SCOMPLAINT measure can be interpreted as the excess returns following recalls with a complaint score of 1. Thus, we find that recalls with a complaint score of 1 experience negative excess returns of -8.4% over the six-month period following the recall announcement date. The relation between excess returns and the standardized complaint is statistically significant (at the 1% level) and economically large (more than 17%) when we examine the longer horizon (12-month) excess returns following the recall announcement date.
Thus, we find that a substantial amount of the information embedded in complaints is realized during the 12-month period following the recall report date. In sum, we find that the market, in general, does not impound the complaint data into share prices until after a recall is announced, creating an opportunity for information advantage for investors able to decipher and act on it before recall announcements.
XV
Customer Complaints and Institutional Trading
In this section, we examine whether the institutional investors as a group utilize the customer complaint information in their trades in a timely manner before we partition our analyses on the type of institutional investors, i.e., mutual versus pension funds, and then examine the effects of their industry trading concentration. We estimate the following model:
where ATRADE is abnormal dollar value of net investor trading in the pre-recall period, ATRADE_PRE, in the first post-recall period, ATRADE_POST1, or in the second post-recall period, ATRADE_POST2. The other variables are defined as in the previous section.
In Table 4 , we report the results from estimation of model (4). We find that the coefficient on the standardized complaint measure is insignificant when we assess the net institutional abnormal trading in the pre-recall period, ATRADE_PRE. This indicates that institutional investors, in general, do not incorporate complaint information in their trading decisions as of the recall announcement date. We next regress abnormal net trading in the first and second post-recall periods on customer complaint and control variables. Here we find a negative and significant relation between abnormal net trading and our complaint measure. Our findings suggest that the institutional investors as a group become aware of the recall campaign's details and its financial consequences only after the recall report date. These results are similar to those we observe for the overall market except we find a significant abnormal net selling by institutional investors in the first 3-months following the recall announcement date while the overall market return is insignificant.
Mutual versus Pension Funds
In this section, we partition institutional investors into mutual and pension funds based on the fund type identifier provided by Ancerno Ltd. As discussed previously, mutual funds differ from pension funds on many dimensions, including investment horizon and portfolio turnover.
Thus, we examine the possibility that they may differ in their use of the customer complaint information to inform their trading decisions. We examine this possibility by estimating the following regression model: 
where MF is a dummy variable taking value of 1 for mutual funds and 0 for pension funds. The other variables are defined as before. If mutual and pension funds differ in their use of the NHTSA complaint data to impact their investment decisions, we would expect a significant coefficient on the SCOMPLAINT*MF interaction term.
We compute abnormal net trading around each recall announcement separately for mutual funds and pension funds. Thus, our sample size for this analysis increases to 1,158, i.e., (579 x2). Because there are more than one observations for each firm-recall, we cluster standard errors by firm-recall. Table 5 reports the results from estimation of model (5). In the pre-recall period, we find that the coefficient on SCOMPLAINT is positive and significant, suggesting that pension funds are net buyers rather than sellers in the pre-recall period. Thus, we find that pension funds do not directly incorporate the complaint data into their trading decisions in the pre-recall period. We find, however, that the coefficient on the SCOMPLAINT*MF interaction term, β 3 , is negative and significant, suggesting that mutual funds are better than pension funds at incorporating the customer complaint information in their trading decisions in the pre-recall period. Overall, we find that mutual funds are abnormal net sellers when complaint levels are high even before recall announcements, suggesting that, in general, they utilize the customer complaint information to assess the increased likelihood of recalls associated with high level of customer complaints.
The results obtained using the abnormal trading activity in the first and second post-recall announcement periods provide further support for the differences in the use of complaint information by mutual and pension funds. Specifically, when we estimate model (5) using abnormal net trading in the first and the second post-event periods, we find that the coefficient on SCOMPLAINT is insignificant. This suggests that pension funds put an end to their abnormal buying activity in the post-recall announcement period. On the other hand, we find that the interaction term, SCOMPLAINT*MF, is negative and significant in the first and second postevent periods, suggesting that mutual funds are better than pension funds at incorporating customer complaint information in their post-recall trading decisions. Overall, we find significant differences between mutual and pension funds in their use of information in customer complaints in both pre-and post-recall periods.
Our results suggest that differences between mutual funds and pension funds affect their use of industry specific information to inform current trading behavior. Specifically, as more active short-horizon investors, mutual funds appear to respond more timely to the negative implications of complaint information. In contrast, pension funds as long-horizon investors may perceive the level of complaints as transient in nature and continue to hold their positions in the stocks of giant automakers as they focus more on long-term profitability, and less on possible short-term trading gains (Yan and Zhang, 2009; Ramalingegowda, 2014) .
Customer Complaints and Industry Trading Concentration
In this section, we investigate our main hypothesis that institutional investors Because we find that mutual funds and pension funds differ substantially in their use of the NHTSA complaint information, we examine the effect of trading concentration separately for these two types of investment funds. Our sample size for this analysis increases to 1,737, i.e., (579 x3) as we calculate abnormal net buying separately for each trading concentration group.
As previously, because there are more than one observations for each firm-recall, we cluster standard errors by firm-recall. Panel A of Table 6 reports the results for the mutual funds. In the pre-recall period, we find that the coefficient on the standardized complaint measure, SCOMPLAINT, is insignificant, suggesting that mutual funds with low auto industry trading concentration (i.e., CONS=0) do not incorporate the complaint data into their trading decisions in this period. The coefficient on the CONS*SCOMPLIANT interaction term, β 3 , however, is negative and significant. This finding is consistent with our information advantage predictions and suggests that mutual funds with greater industry trading concentration are better at incorporating the customer complaint information in their trading decisions. The interaction term also continues to be negative and significant in the post-event periods, with greater magnitudes.
Thus, we find that a mutual fund's industry trading concentration is associated with its ability to incorporate the NHTSA complaint information in its trading decisions in a timely manner, and even before a product recall announcement.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the regression results for pension funds. Here we find that the industry trading concentration has essentially no association with a pension fund's use of the complaint information in its trading decisions in either the pre-or the post-recall periods.
Specifically, we find that the coefficients on the standardized complaint measure, In sum, we find strong evidence that mutual funds that concentrate trading in the auto industry appear to trade based on the information contained in the NHTSA complaint data, but non-concentrating mutual funds do not. Our finding that only industry trade concentrating mutual funds engage in negative abnormal trading prior to recalls when complaints levels are high, is consistent with the information advantage reason for investment concentration. Thus, our empirical examination of a specific source of value relevant industry-specific data, and detailed investor trade data both support and extend prior research concluding investors concentrate their investment efforts in firms or industries that they have an information advantage (Kacperczyk et al., 2005; Baks et al., 2006; Ivkovic et al., 2008; Cici et al., 2014; Hiraki et al., 2015) . Our study is the first to examine a specific set of publicly available data as a possible cause of information advantage for investors able to properly analyze it, and the first to document a significant association between this data source and investor trading behavior -but only for mutual funds that concentrate more of their trades in the auto industry. Moreover, unlike mutual funds, we find that pension funds' use of the NHTSA complaint data does not improve with their industry trading concentration. While most prior research attributes investment concentration to an information advantage, our findings suggest that pension funds appear to concentrate trades in the auto industry for reasons other than the information advantage.
Additional findings
In order to test the robustness of our findings, we further analyze the type of customer complaint. As indicated by the NHTSA complaint files, auto complaints may not be identical. In particular, some complaints are associated with accidents on the roads, injuries, and even sometimes death, while others are related with trivial concerns such as mislabeled or missing placards, problems in the seat adjustment mechanisms, or a malfunctioning glovebox lock (Liu and Shankar, 2015; Reilly and Hoffer, 1983) . As a result, we form a summary complaint metric by first standardizing the number of complaints mentioning incidents, injuries, crashes, fires, and deaths at the firm-level and then taking the average of these standardized measures. Using this alternative standardized complaint measure in model (5) produces similar results to those presented in Table 6 . Specifically, when we re-estimate the model for mutual funds, we find that the coefficient on the CONS*SCOMPLIANT interaction term, β 3 , is again significantly negative in both pre-and post-recall periods. We also find that the CONS*SCOMPLAINT interaction term is insignificant in each period when we restrict the sample to pension funds, consistent with our main results.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we provide evidence on the broad issue of investment trading concentration (i.e., industry specialization) and information advantage. Specifically, we examine whether industry trading concentration is associated with sophisticated investors' use of industry specific information to inform their trading behavior. We employ customer complaint data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and investigate whether level of auto industry trading concentration is associated with institutional investors' use of this data to inform their trades. We first show that the customer complaint data is value-relevant and is negatively associated with auto firm future stock prices, and that the overall market does not impound this data into stock prices until after a recall announcement it made. We then find that institutional investors, in the aggregate, are net abnormal sellers of auto industry firms, but only after auto product recall announcements. These results suggest that, similar to the general market, institutional investors as a group become aware of the recall campaign's details and its financial consequences only after the recall report date. We then partition our sample investment funds into mutual funds and pension funds to find that mutual funds respond more timely than pension funds to the negative implications of high customer complaints.
To examine the effect of the level of auto industry trading concentration on trading behavior, we calculate a fund-specific measure of auto industry trading concentration based on the percentage of auto industry dollar volume traded to total dollar volume traded in all industries for the period. We find that mutual funds with greater industry trading concentration exhibit trading patterns consistent with the use of the NHTSA data, while mutual funds with low industry trading concentration do not. Specifically, mutual funds with greater industry trading concentration are significant abnormal net sellers of auto industry firms before recall announcements when complaint levels are high, while mutual funds with low industry trading concentration are not. Thus, to our knowledge, we provide the first direct evidence that investors with higher industry trading concentration exploit industry-specific information to inform their trading, while similar sophisticated non-concentrator investors do not. Our finding of betterinformed trading by industry concentrating mutual funds provides direct support for the superior information processing aspect of the information advantage argument.
Our results support and extend prior research by documenting a specific context in which information advantage could be, and in fact appears to be, exploited by industry specialists. Our finding of better-informed trading by industry concentrating mutual funds also supports both our trade-based measure of industry concentration and is consistent with higher specialist performance found in other professional business settings.
Our finding that pension funds, regardless of their level of auto industry trading concentration, do not appear to trade based on the NHTSA data, extends the literature on industry concentration to pension funds. Finding that pension funds do not trade consistent with the NHTSA complaint data is likely a reflection of their long-term investment horizon and that elevated complaint levels and recall announcements may be perceived by these funds as more transitory in nature and not fully reflective of an auto firm's long run prosperity and stock price performance. Furthermore, our finding of heterogeneous trading behavior for mutual funds and pension funds provides additional insights into the microstructure of institutional investor trading behavior and reinforces the need to separately examine these two types of institutional investors.
In particular, unlike most prior research attributing investment concentration to information advantage, our findings suggest that pension funds appear to concentrate trades in the auto industry for reasons other than superior information processing.
Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of a straightforward measure of investor industry trading concentration. Calculating industry concentration as a percentage of an investor's overall trading activity in a single industry is a simple and intuitive determination of an investor's relative focus on a specific industry. Our results suggest that this measure of industry concentration may be useful in other investment contexts, and that future researchers should consider industry trading concentration when examining investment behavior. CAR[t1, t2] is the cumulative value-weighted excess returns between the days t1 and t2 relative to the recall report date, MV is market value computed as the stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, BM is book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of common stock divided by MV as of the most recent fiscal year before the event window, MOMENTUM is cumulative abnormal returns (raw return minus the CRSP value-weighted index returns) over the three-month period ending at the beginning of the event window, 2 days before recall report date. Table 3 presents coefficient estimates from model (2) CAR= β0 + β1SCOMPLAINT + β2LMV+ β3BM+ β4MOMENTUM+ ε where CAR is the cumulative value-weighted excess returns over the 3-month, CAR [+2, +63], CAR[+2, +126] , and 12-month, CAR [+2,+253] , horizons beginning two days following the recall announcement date, LMV is log market value (MV) computed as the stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, SCOMPLAINT is the standardized value of COMPLAINT where COMPLAINT is the number of customer complaints associated with the recall for the preceding one-year period ending one day before the recall date, BM is book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of common stock divided by MV as of the most recent fiscal year before the event window, MOMENTUM is cumulative abnormal returns (raw return minus the CRSP value-weighted index returns) over the three-month period ending at the beginning of the event window, 2 days before recall report date. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors per White (1980) . ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. where ATRADE is abnormal dollar value of net investor trading in the pre-recall period, ATRADE_PRE, in the first post-recall period, ATRADE_POST1, or in the second post-recall period, ATRADE_POST2, LMV is log market value (MV) computed as the stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, SCOMPLAINT is the standardized value of COMPLAINT where COMPLAINT is the number of customer complaints associated with the recall for the preceding one-year period ending one day before the recall date, BM is book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of common stock divided by MV as of the most recent fiscal year before the event window, MOMENTUM is cumulative abnormal returns (raw return minus the CRSP valueweighted index returns) over the three-month period ending at the beginning of the event window, 2 days before recall report date. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors per White (1980). ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. where ATRADE is abnormal dollar value of net investor trading in the pre-recall period, ATRADE_PRE, in the first post-recall period, ATRADE_POST1, or in the second post-recall period, ATRADE_POST2, MF is a dummy variable taking value of 1 for mutual funds and 0 for pension funds, LMV is log market value (MV) computed as the stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, SCOMPLAINT is the standardized value of COMPLAINT where COMPLAINT is the number of customer complaints associated with the recall for the preceding one-year period ending one day before the recall date, BM is book-tomarket ratio calculated as the book value of common stock divided by MV as of the most recent fiscal year before the event window, MOMENTUM is cumulative abnormal returns (raw return minus the CRSP value-weighted index returns) over the three-month period ending at the beginning of the event window, 2 days before recall report date. Numbers in parentheses are tstatistics calculated using standard errors per White (1980). ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. where ATRADE is abnormal dollar value of net investor trading in the pre-recall period, ATRADE_PRE, in the first post-recall period, ATRADE_POST1, or in the second post-recall period, ATRADE_POST2, SPEC is our measure of industry concentration taking value of 0 for low industry concentration funds, 0.5 for funds with middle industry concentration, and 1 for funds with high industry concentration, LMV is log market value (MV) computed as the stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, SCOMPLAINT is the standardized value of COMPLAINT where COMPLAINT is the number of customer complaints associated with the recall for the preceding one-year period ending one day before the recall date, BM is book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of common stock divided by MV as of the most recent fiscal year before the event window, MOMENTUM is cumulative abnormal returns (raw return minus the CRSP value-weighted index returns) over the three-month period ending at the beginning of the event window, 2 days before recall report date. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors per White (1980). ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. where ATRADE is abnormal dollar value of net investor trading in the pre-recall period, ATRADE_PRE, in the first post-recall period, ATRADE_POST1, or in the second post-recall period, ATRADE_POST2, CONS is our measure of industry concentration taking value of 0 for low industry concentration funds, 0.5 for funds with middle industry concentration, and 1 for funds with high industry concentration, LMV is log market value (MV) computed as the stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, SCOMPLAINT is the standardized value of COMPLAINT where COMPLAINT is the number of customer complaints associated with the recall for the preceding one-year period ending one day before the recall date, BM is book-tomarket ratio calculated as the book value of common stock divided by MV as of the most recent fiscal year before the event window, MOMENTUM is cumulative abnormal returns (raw return minus the CRSP value-weighted index returns) over the three-month period ending at the beginning of the event window, 2 days before recall report date. Numbers in parentheses are tstatistics calculated using standard errors per White (1980). ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Endnotes
I We examine trades concentrated in an industry sector. The proprietary trading data we exploit in the study provides trading data; however, it does not allow us to determine individual firm holdings. II See for example Brands et al. (2005) , Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) , Kacperczyk et al.(2005) , Ivkovic et al. (2008) , Gompers et al. (2009 ), Pool et al. (2012 , Ekholm and Maury (2014) , and Kostovetsky and Ratushny (2016) . III An alternative explanation could be that concentrated funds get private information about recalls from firm management and trade on it rather than using their own analysis of the complaint data. However, Jiang and Sun (2014) argue that investment dispersion among mutual funds will be high when a subgroup of mutual funds has positive private information because they will trade on positive private information while short sale constraints prevent them from using negative private information. Given that we examine funds' response to negative information, our results are less likely to be driven by some mutual funds acting on negative private information. IV This positive association is also from the synergistic effect of investors continuing to seek out information advantage with regard to the specific firms or industries in which they choose to concentrate. V A large literature establishes the important role that institutional investors play in the financial markets. Prior research has found that institutional investors are able to profitably trade on publicly available information (Bushee and Goodman, 2007; Yan and Zhang, 2009; Jegadeesh and Tang, 2010) , and their trades also provide information to the market that effects individual firm valuation (Sias and Starks, 1997; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012) . Compared to other investors, institutional investors have greater resources available to analyze publicly available information about business and industry trends, as well as on individual companies, that they use to inform their trades (Ke and Ramalingegowda, 2005; Green et al., 2014; Ng and Troianovski, 2015; Solomon and Soltes, 2015) . Institutional investors also have the ability to hire professional fund managers and analysts to perform extensive data collection and analysis, which also enables them to outperform the general public (Sias and Starks, 1997; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009) . Accordingly, prior studies (Ke and Petroni, 2004; Pinnuck, 2004; Ke et al., 2008) generally observe that institutional investors are able to execute profitable trades based on their ability to effectively analyze all available information, and that there is a positive relationship between changes in institutional holdings and firms' future earnings and stock price returns. Consequently, institutional investors appear to be able to incorporate price-relevant company information better than other market participants (Collins et al., 2003; Ke and Petroni, 2004; Hribar et al., 2009; Ramalingegowda, 2014) . VI Data representatives at Ancerno Ltd. confirm that their investor clients submit all their trades to them for transaction cost analysis. VII Therefore, we do not need to employ the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to infer the direction of the trade. VIII Ancerno Ltd. stopped reporting unique fund identifiers after 2010 and therefore we cannot extend our analysis beyond 2010. IX We truncate the complaints for vehicles older than 20 years because vehicles older than 20 years are assumed to be near the end of their normal life cycles for most users, and recall announcements for vehicles older than 20 years is not common.
X We exclude Chrysler because institutional investor trading is not available for the time it was owned by Fiat during our examination period. XI Our measure of industry concentration is similar to Ekholm and Maury's (2014) Average Weight Index, except that our measure is for an industry and not a single firm, and is from the investor's perspective and not that of the firm. In addition, unlike other measures, we base our concentration measure on trading volume and not holdings at the end of the period, as holdings may not accurately reflect the amount of trading activity in the industry over the period. XII In this study, industry i represent the auto industry. The trading concentration metric for each fund is updated every year. XIII Since fund-industry level trading activity (the numerator) is scaled by the total fund activity (the denominator) our concentration metric computed in percentages is not biased by the size of fund. XIV We obtain MOMENTUM separately for each event period, i.e., PRE, POST1, and POST2 but report the descriptive statistics only for the MOMENTUM for the PRE period. XV This finding is also consistent with the evidence presented in Gokalp et al (2016) .
